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Abstract 
Mobile phone banking and payments continues to not only be a popular way of transacting business but it also 
seems to evolve rapidly. Despite its popularity however there seem to be some very genuine concerns on the 
security issues revolving around it, particularly in regard to man in the middle attacks. This paper seeks to 
propose a secure framework for communication between a mobile device and the back end server for protecting 
mobile banking applications from man-in-the-middle attacks without introducing further threats to the 
communication channel. 
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1.0 Introduction  
1.1 Man in the Middle Attacks on Mobile Banking Applications  
A Man in the middle attack is one in which the attacker intercepts messages in a public key exchange and then 
retransmits them, substituting his own public key for the requested one, so that the two original parties still 
appear to be communicating with each other (Chellegati 2009) 
The attack gets its name from the ball game where two people try to throw a ball directly to each other 
while one person in between them attempts to catch it. In a Man in the middle attack, the intruder uses a program 
that appears to be the server to the client and appears to be the client to the server. The attack may be used 
simply to gain access to the message, or enable the attacker to modify the message before retransmitting it 
(Koutney, 2010). 
Man in the middle attacks are sometimes known as fire brigade attacks. The term derives from the 
bucket brigade method of putting out a fire by handing buckets of water from one person to another between a 
water source and the fire. (Cheng 2010) 
 
1.2 Risks Associated With Man In The Middle Attacks  
Researchers have uncovered defects in a wide range of applications running on computers, smartphones, and 
Web servers that could make them susceptible to attacks exposing passwords, credit card numbers, and other 
sensitive data.  (Kuoffong 2011) 
The Trillion and AIM instant messaging apps and an Android app offered by some international banks 
are three apps identified as vulnerable to so-called Man-in-the-middle attacks. Like the other dozen or so 
applications identified, the threat stemmed from weak implementations of the secure sockets layer and transport 
layer security protocols. Together, the technologies are designed to guarantee the confidentiality and authenticity 
of communications between end users and servers connected over the Internet. (Beyah 2012) 
The weak implementations caused the programs to initiate encrypted communications without first 
assessing the validity of the digital certificates on the other end. As a result, one of the fundamental guarantees of 
the SSL- that the computer on the other end of the connection belongs to the party claiming ownership was 
fundamentally compromised. Instead, the apps will trust imposter certificates that are signed by attackers or fail 
established validity tests for a variety of other reasons. (Peterson 2014) 
"Our main conclusion is that SSL certificate validation is completely broken in many critical software 
applications and libraries," a team of researchers wrote in a paper titled “The Most Dangerous Code in the World: 
Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software”. When presented with self-signed and third-party 
certificates including a certificate issued by a legitimate authority to a domain called 
AllYourSSLAreBelongTo.us; they establish SSL connections and send their secrets to a Man in the middle 
attacker (Georgiev, Iyenga, Jana 2012) 
The scenario described by the researchers is precisely the attack SSL is intended to protect against. The 
research demonstrated how holes in apps downloaded as many as 185 million times from Google's official 
Android market left passwords, emails and instant messages contents vulnerable to theft. 
Instant messaging clients Trillian and AIM are among the apps that fail to properly validate SSL 
certificates before establishing a secure connection, according to the researchers. Man in the middle attacks on 
Trillian, depending on the specific setup, can yield login credentials for a variety of third-party services 
(including Google Talk, AIM, Yahoo!, and Windows Live services). The AIM client version 1.0.1.2 on 
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Windows also accepts certificates signed by untrusted parties and also fails to verify if the host name on the 
certificate conforms to the Internet address the app is connected to. (Salif 2012) 
Similar weaknesses in the mobile banking app for Google’s Android operating system also put users at 
risk, the researchers said. "Even a primitive network attacker—for example, someone in control of a malicious 
Wi-Fi access point—can exploit this vulnerability to harvest the login credentials of mobile banking customers," 
the paper warned.(Ornaghi 2014) 
The researchers attributed weaknesses to the "terrible design" of the programming interfaces provided 
in widely used code libraries that implement SSL. In some cases, the libraries leave it up to individual apps to 
validate the certificates presented when they connect to a server. In other cases, options chosen by app 
developers inadvertently turn off validation routines that by default are supposed to run. In actual sense these 
Application Program Interfaces (APIs) are extremely confusing, they are very easy to get wrong and people do 
get them wrong all the time. (Ornaghi 2014) 
The risks and prevalence associated with Man in the middle attacks cannot be taken for granted, as In 
October 19, 2012 the FBI warning on Android malware included the mobile version of spyware that was sold to 
law enforcement and governments, demonstrating how such commercial applications can pose a threat to private 
companies and consumers. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center said during the time that FinFisher was 
among the latest malware brought to its attention, along with a Trojan called Loozfon. To infect phones, 
criminals were sending text messages with links leading to a malicious web site. (Beyah 2012). For some time 
now, FinFisher has been used in compromising personal computers. The commercial version was originally 
purchased understated by the cases bellow:   
 
(a) by law enforcement agencies and governments as spyware in almost a dozen countries. This piece of 
software developed for law enforcement purposes has now turned out to pose a threat to Android phones. The 
Android version of FinFisher enables cybercriminals to take control of a device and monitor its use to steal 
personal information, such as user IDs and passwords to online banking sites. Loozfon steals contacts lists and 
the infected phone's number. Criminals use such information to create more convincing text messages to lure 
more people to malicious websites. Both malware take advantage of vulnerabilities within WebKit, an open 
source layout engine used in Apple Safari and Google Chrome browsers, Daniel Ford, chief security officer for 
mobile security firm Fixmo, said. In that respect, FinFisher and Loozfon are similar to other data-stealing 
Android malware. 
 
(b)The malware risk on Android phones is a growing concern. A study released this in 2002 by Symantec found 
that 67% of large companies were worried about malware spreading from mobile devices to Internal networks. 
McAfee reported finding in the first three months of the year 2011 7,000 malware targeting the Android platform 
versus 1,000 for other mobile operating systems. By comparison, the total number of malware discovered in the 
middle of 2011 was in the hundreds, McAfee said. Part of the increase was due to improvements in detection. 
Despite the growing threat, wireless carriers and Android device makers continue to do a poor job at patching the 
software (Beyah 2012) 
Hundreds of free apps in the Android market vulnerable to Man in the middle attacks as a result of 
unsound use of secure socket layer (SSL). In October 19, 2012—German university researchers have found 
hundreds of popular Android apps in the Google Play market that leave millions of users vulnerable to attackers 
looking to steal banking credentials, credit card numbers and other personal information. 
The problem is in the way the tablet and smartphone apps implement the security protocol used in 
communicating with users' Web browsers, the researchers said. An analysis of thousands of free apps found 
nearly 8% vulnerable to Man in the middle attacks as a result of unsound use of secure socket layer (SSL). 
In general, mobile apps use transport layer security (TLS), which includes the SSL protocol, for 
transmitting and receiving sensitive data while communicating with a Web server. The researchers claim that 
flaws in the implementation make it possible for an attacker to intercept and control the data traffic. During the 
analysis, researchers were able to intercept from the apps a variety of user information, such as credit card 
numbers, bank account information, PayPal credentials and social network credentials. The researchers, who 
worked in teams from the Leibniz University in Hanover and Philipps University of Hamburg, used a 
homegrown proof-of-concept tool called MalloDroid, which was designed to identify exploitable SSL bugs, 
Threatpost. The apps analyzed with the tool represented 17% of the apps that contain HTTPS URLs, which 
indicate that they use SSL. The researchers manually audited 100 apps and found 41 vulnerable to Man in the 
middle attacks because of SSL misuse. The cumulative install base of all the vulnerable apps ranged between 
39.5 million and 185 million users, based on information the researchers gathered from Google Play."The actual 
number is likely to be larger, since alternative app markets for Android also contribute to the install base," the 
researchers said. From the 41 apps analyzed manually, the researchers were able to capture credentials for 
American Express, Diners Club, Paypal, bank accounts, Facebook, Twitter, Google, Yahoo, Microsoft Live ID, 
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Box, WordPress, remote control servers, arbitrary email accounts and IBM Same time. In addition, the 
researchers were able to disable anti-virus apps and remotely inject and execute code.   
 
1.3 Methods and Techniques Used by Hackers in Perpetrating Man in the middle attacks 
The most common Man in the middle attack that can be associated with mobile banking applications is the Zeus 
attack (also known as Zbot, Wsnpoem or Gorhax). This is more or less like a Trojan horse that steals banking 
information by keystroke logging and form grabbing. Zeus is spread mainly through downloads and phishing 
schemes. First identified in July 2007 when it was used to steal information from the USA department of 
transport, it became more widespread in June 2009, (Buger 2010). 
It was largely believed that The Zeus Botnet only targets Microsoft Windows machines, and computers 
running Windows Vista make up the majority of the Botnet, though newer versions also affect higher versions of 
windows. (Buger 2010) It was further believed that (and it’s still the case now) every criminal can control 
whatever information he/she is  interested in and fine tune his copy of Zeus to only steal those. Examples include 
login credentials for online social networks, e-mail accounts, online banking or other online financial services. 
The most disturbing aspect of Zeus is perhaps the fact that it is readily available to buy in underground forums 
for as little as 700 USD (if sold from a reseller) and up to 15,000 USD for the newest version with all available 
features. (Anderson 2009) The package contains a builder that can generate a bot executable, web server files 
(PHP, images, SQL templates) for use as the command and control server. While Zbot is a generic back door 
that allows full control by an unauthorized remote user, the primary function of Zbot is financial gain - stealing 
online credentials such as FTP, email, online banking, and other online passwords. The latest public version that 
is available is 2.0.8.9. (Buger, 2010).  
Zeus is very difficult to detect even with up-to-date antivirus software. This is the primary reason why 
its malware family is considered the largest botnet on the internet. 
 Unfortunately for mobile banking application users, the Zeus banking Trojan has jumped the bridge to 
the large and growing ecosystem of mobile devices powered by Google's Android operating system. Security 
researchers at Fortinet  say they have obtained a Zeus variant, dubbed "Zitmo," that can run on Android phones 
and that has the ability to intercept one time pass codes sent to mobile phones as an added, "two factor" security 
measure. (Anderson, 2009). The same researchers were responsible for discovering Earlier Zeus variants that run 
on Nokia Symbian, RIM Blackberry and Microsoft Windows Mobile devices. 
ZitMo (Zeus-In-The-Mobile) ZitMo is not a MitB Trojan itself (although it performs a similar proxy 
function on the incoming SMSes), but is mobile malware suggested for installation on a mobile phone by a Zeus 
infected computer. By intercepting all incoming SMSes, it defeats SMS-based banking OOB two-factor 
authentication on Windows Mobile, Android, Symbian, BlackBerry. ZitMo may be detected by Antivirus 
running on the mobile device. It is also worth noting that SpitMo (SpyEye-In-The-Mobile, SPITMO), is similar 
to ZitMo.The new Android variants are just the latest evidence that malware authors are expanding their 
operations to mobile devices. Fortinet researcher Axelle Aprville, claims that Fortinet researchers have observed 
conversations relating to Zeus for Android, but were finally able to obtain and test a sample. The malware they 
obtained looks much like known Android malware variants. It masquerades as a banking security application. 
The malware is intended to thwart online banking security systems that rely on so-called out-of-band (OOB) 
authentication: sending pass codes to pre-registered cell phones that are required to start an online banking 
session (Aravamudhan, 2009). 
 
2.0 securing communication in mobile banking against man in the middle attacks 
2.1 Defense Startegies againts man in the middle attacks 
There are a myriad of possible countermeasures that can be deployed to help control if not deter man in the 
middle attacks attacks and their implications in mobile banking and general secure communication (Claudio and 
Zhou 2011). Few of the defensive considerations may allow for a stronger security posture for multiple parts of 
the overall network infrastructure, while others will focus specifically on defenses against man in the middle 
attacks attacks. 
 
2.2 Knowing the Threats 
Knowing the threats and how the threats can be identified and mitigated will provide valuable  
information need to implement defensive controls. Whether the controls implemented are active controls to stop 
attacks in their tracks, or passive controls used to monitor for attacks, knowing t 
he types of attacks used by attackers is one of the greatest things that can be done to prepare agains such 
attacks. The threat landscape as with the technogical world is dynamic and keeps changing, as such continued 
awareness of the threats and attack techniques will allow for preparation of  defenses and stay vigilant in your 
defensive initiatives, including sucurity controls and protocols. (Claudio and Zhou 2011; Kim, 2013). 
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2.3 Defense-in-Depth Approach 
Implementing defensive security controls at various layers within the network allows for more challenges an 
attacker will have to overcome to be successful at obtaining his or her objective. The primary layer for instance 
could include Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSes) and early detection which are vital to minimizing the impact 
of attacks, reducing potential losses.  
The Secondary defensive measure woud be physial secrity measures such as a well-placed proxy or 
firewall devices. The goal of this line of defense is to slow attacks or at least to make it very challenging and 
tedious to perform them. Next layer of defence provide the last line of defence and are security measures such as 
such as malware and virus protection, host-based firewalls and IDS, patch management, and system auditing 
controls. (Peterson and Reiher, 2014). 
These multi-layered implemention of some of these controls will reduce the overall likelihood of an 
attacker being successful in their exploits and minimize loss incase of succesful breach. Monitoring, evaluation 
and review of these security controls is important and since no single solution will provide all the security needs 
it is important to understand that secrity is a procces and not a product and each layer provides a part of the 
overall solution. (Claudio and Zhou 2011). 
2.3.1 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
One possible solution to address man in the middle attacks involves deploying a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
that implements mutual authentication. PKI manages the use of public key cryptography. In a PKI, there are 
several components that handle the issuance and revocation of certificates as well as attesting for the validity of 
certificates that are implemented. These are important components as it is the basis of ensuring we can trust 
encryption, signatures, and the implementation a given PKI is responsible for. (Claudio and Zhou 2011). 
As it relates to SSL and HTTPS connections, the process verifies the validity of a certificate is as 
follows: when connecting to a server that is using a digitally signed SSL certificate, the server will send the 
certificate to the Web user’s browser. Upon verification of the validity of the SSL certificate, the browser will 
connect to the server using the SSL protocol. A session key is created and used to protect the data that travels 
between the user’s browser and the server. The session key is unique to the session and is used as a means of 
ensuring private communication between the user and the Web server. (Prowell, 2010). 
It is important to note that, implementing a PKI by itself is not enough to prevent man in the middle 
attacks. If an attacker can capture key exchanges at the beginning of a session, he or she may still be able to 
perform man in the middle attacks, therefore implementing other controls that complement PKI implementations 
should be considered. Although PKI on its own is not a sufficient mitigating control against man in the middle 
attacks  attacks, when it is coupled with mutual authentication, the solution is more appealing. Mutual 
authentication is the concept of requiring not just a client to authenticate to a server but also the server to 
authenticate to the client. With many client and server implementations, the initial trust is only confirmed by a 
one-way verification between the client and the server. With mutual authentication, the server verifies the client 
and the client verifies the server to ensure legitimate communications are being exchanged. Verification can be 
conducted by using public and private keys. Implementing mutual authentication and PKI together can increase 
the complexity of and significantly reduce the likelihood of successful man in the middle attacks  attacks. (Kim, 
2013; BITS, 2013).   
2.3.2 Encrypted Protocols 
Encrypted protocols should be implemented whenever possible to reduce the likelihood that credentials will be 
sniffed off the network by attackers. Some examples of clear-text protocols still heavily used in networks today 
include; FTP, TELNET, and HTTP. Most clear-text protocols today have an encrypted alternative that can 
provide an additional layer of security. Some of the popular alternatives for the previously mentioned protocols 
include Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP), Secure Shell (SSH), and HTTPs. It is important to keep in mind 
that encrypted protocols should be used for protecting communications for remote administration and for 
protecting sensitive data that is being transmitted for everyday applications. 
Implementing encrypted protocols not only protects data while it is in transit but also can add an 
additional layer of complexity for attackers to deal with when trying to perform attacks such as an man in the 
middle attacks  attack. As a basic security recommendation, encrypted protocols should always be used instead 
of clear-text protocols, not just because of the threat of MAN IN THE MIDDLE ATTACKS  attacks, but for the 
protection of data while in transit in general, (Claudio and Zhou 2011). 
2.3.3 Securing Server Interactions (Application Development) 
Mobile banking entails securing data transmission off the device to other parties, notably servers that the client 
application interacts with. The risk analysis of the data being transfered over the network will dictate the level of 
protection needed. (Bahr,2011). 
2.3.4 Confidentiality and Authentication 
When data is being sent off the device to somewhere else, a security-minded developers must consider two 
primary considerations. The first is authentication. In this context, it refers to the capability of verifying that the 
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entity we are communicating with, either sending data to or receiving data from, is the entity that we think it is. 
This is important for many reasons: First, to ensure that the computer to which we are uploading data from the 
device is an entity that should have it, otherwise, we may be exposing confidential data to a party that should not 
have access to it, and also to download data only from a trusted source (Jeon et al, 2011). 
An increasing number of internet-based end-customer applications require two-factor authentication. 
Text message (SMS) based one-time code distribution (as second factor) is rapidly becoming the most popular 
choice when strong authentication is needed, for example in e-banking. When implemented correctly, multi-
factor authentication can make it significantly more difficult more difficult for man in the middle attacks (Kim, 
2013). 
The other consideration is the confidentiality of the data being transmitted over the network. This refers 
to steps that prevent a third-party from reading the data while it is being transmitted. For instance financial data 
sent from a bank server to an app running a device to be read by another party who happens to have access to a 
critical part of the cellular data network (Bahr, 2011; Jeon et al, 2011). 
According to Dacosta (2012) the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol and its successor, Transport 
Layer Security (TLS), have become the de facto means of providing strong cryptographic protection for network 
traffic. While vulnerabilities are occasionally found in specific implementations, SSL/TLS are widely viewed as 
robust means of providing confidentiality, integrity and server authentication. The SSL/TLS protocols are the 
main security mechanisms used to protect the communications between browsers and web applications. By 
providing a transparent encryption layer, SSL/TLS guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the data in 
transit. Moreover, SSL/TLS allow browsers to authenticate web application’s servers via digital certificates. A 
digital certificate binds the server’s identity (i.e., domain name) to the server’s public key and it is signed by a 
Certification Authority (CA) trusted by both the server and the browser. Initially, due to performance 
considerations, most web applications used SSL/TLS only to protect requests carrying private data (e.g., 
passwords, credit card numbers). However, due to the increasing number of attacks against web sessions (e.g., 
session hijacking), many applications have been forced to protect all their communications with SSL/TLS 
(Prowell, 2010; Dacosta, 2012). 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Judging by the evidence carried out in this research, it is quite apparent that a single defense strategy for 
protecting mobile phone based banking transactions is still far from being achieved.  
This is mainly due to the complex nature of implementing the transactions but also due to the fact that 
there are a multiple number of parties involved and each of this parties have a role to play in ensuring that the 
transactions being engaged have the bare minimum of acceptable security controls.   
This dissertation proposes a defense-in-depth strategy for implementing controls against man-in-the 
middle attacks on mobile phone based banking transactions.  
A normative comparison of existing efforts for implementing controls against man in the middle attacks 
show that the proposes solution in this thesis addresses a major concern which revolves around an attempt to 
curb further threats from other sources within the communication channel.  
As mentioned earlier in chapter three, the human interaction Protocol, the Site key and the WiKID 
strong authentication system all have flaws associated with them. The human interactive security protocol 
heavily relies on human intervention to implement controls against man in the middle attacks ; however it does 
not address other loopholes or techniques that can be exploited during such an attack. The site key approach on 
the other hand has an obvious flaw in the design since a phishing site can get the correct SiteKey info from the 
genuine site, then serve it to the user, "proving" its legitimacy SiteKey is thus susceptible to a Man-in-the-middle 
attack. (Kugler 2003).  As far as the WiKID strong authentication protocol is concerned, it attempts to secure 
transmission on a LAN, MAN or WAN, however it does not adequately deal with the problem of man in the 
middle attacks  on either such or within mobile applications.  
Based on the normative comparison of the existing studies and the proposed frame work. It is quite 
clear that for a mobile application channel of communication to be secured from man in the middle attacks, then 
the defense in depth approach has to be taken. The proposed model arrived at in this thesis therefore differs from 
the earlier models due to the implementation of a defense in depth approach.   
A defense in depth approach revolves around the notion that implementing defensive security controls 
at various layers within the network allows for more challenges an attacker will have to overcome to be 
successful at obtaining his or her objective. More importantly the controls need to complement each other for 
them to work effectively. 
The defense mechanism for protecting mobile banking applications can be divided into three essential 
security layers, namely: The client; the communication channel and the server.  
The client is represented by the mobile phone user who also happens to own the handset, the 
communication channel is owned by the TELCOs who happen to be the infrastructure service providers and the 
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server is represented by the banking/financial institutions. These layers can be further broken down into sub 
layers depending by their security needs as illustrated in the diagram bellow.  
 
Figure 2.1: framework for securing mobile transactions from a man in the middle attack 
 
The framework can be implemented at each level as illustrated in the table bellow  
2.4.1 Client Level 
Sub level Strategy Implementer 
User Level Provide Knowledge to users by creating awareness 
among users on the possibility of an attack being 
perpetrated during transactions.  
Banking/ Financial 
Institutions 
Application 
(mobile banking 
apps) 
Apps should  facilitate implementation of 
- Multi-Factor Authentication  
- Implementation of Transaction Limits 
- Code meant to implement security Code  
The code  should also be regularly  analyzed and 
reviewed   
Venders/apps  developers 
Device   Phones supporting mobile banking should exhibit the 
following features; Power on passwords, Automatic 
locks, Mobile security software such as anti-virus and 
firewalls, data wiping features  
 NB some smart phones have this features but some 
users may not have enabled them due to lack of 
awareness  
 
Table 2.1: Client level 
 
2.4.2 Communication Channel Level 
Strategy Implementer 
PKI and mutual authentication deployment through (PKI), through proper 
implementation of TLS and SSL, that implements mutual authentication 
TELCO 
Encryption: Data being transmitted over wireless medium should always be 
encrypted so as to add an extra layer of security  
TELCOs, app Developers 
and banking institutions 
Table 2.2 : Communication channel level 
 
Due to the low level of technological awareness by the users of mobile banking services and the high 
level of risk that they are exposed to; securing mobile banking transactions will continue to generate greater 
research interest.  
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2.4.3 Server Level 
Access control via authentication: This can be achieved through Multi-factor authentication, or customer 
authentication, which is a key control for verifying that the end user attempting to access the financial 
institution’s mobile banking solution is the actual authorized consumer. 
Network Security Assessment: These include (a) Security Policy (b) Network Management (c) 
Identification and Authentication (d) Resources Management (e) Account Management 
Threats information sharing: All financial institutions implementing mobile banking need to set up a 
mechanism for sharing new information and threats in regards to mobile banking  
At the moment there are no known standalone techniques for securing the aforementioned transactions. 
The existing ones either do not fully secure the transaction or simply introduce further threats to the transaction. 
This is probably the area where further research needs to be carried out.  
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